“We don’t take our decisions in a vacuum”

Jörg Becker has been the Chairman of the Coordination Group of the Accredited Inspection Bodies in Germany and as a result the successor of Dieter Roas for over a year.

In an interview with the LIFTjournal, Becker explained the position of the inspection bodies regarding cyber security, dealt with criticism of the lift safety report and spoke about the prospects for an overhaul of the Ordinance on Industrial Safety and Health.

Photo: © TÜV Süd

Mr Becker, what are your initial conclusions and what goals have you set yourself for your period in office?
Becker: My first year was intensive and very informative. My predecessor, Dieter Roas, shaped the EC AIB for over ten years and laid an outstanding foundation. I want to carry on from there. My central goal is to make the AIBs fit for the challenges of the future. Specifically, this means not just understanding digitalisation as a catchword but rather integrating it in our testing processes in a meaningful manner.

Another focus will be cyber security. I have a lot of experience regarding this topic from my previous work at TÜV Süd, which I would now like to contribute at the EC AIB level in order to create uniform and above all practical test foundations. Our joint goal is to ensure the high quality and independence of the AIB tests in an increasingly networked and digitalised world.


Intensive discussions repeatedly occur in the lift sector when the annual lift safety report is published. The AIBs are accused of dramatizing accident figures in their own interests. This time, the first sentence of the press release claims three out of four lifts have defects. What do you say to this?
Becker: The number is indeed high and it shows one thing above all: our tests are absolutely necessary to guarantee safety in public spaces. Every single defect uncovered by our work and then corrected contributes to the safety of lifts. However, classifying these figures properly is also important: we differentiate very clearly between minor, considerable and dangerous defects.

The quota of dangerous defects where a lift has to be shut down immediately because of an acute risk for life and limb has for many years been fairly stable at 0.8 percent. But the 10.8 percent of considerable defects are also safety-relevant and must be corrected on time. What is often overlooked: the law specifies a time limit of one year even for the correction of so-called minor defects.

But the criticism, among other from the VDMA, is directed precisely at this differentiation. A large portion of the defects, 64.7 percent to be precise, are “minor defects”. The criticism here is that formal aspects, such as inadequate documentation on cyber security, are included in the same statistics as technical defects. Doesn't the report as a result paint a distorted picture?
Becker: I can understand the criticism, but expressly do not agree with the conclusion. Missing or incomplete documentation is often not just a “formal error”. Let’s take the example of cyber security: the Operational Safety Ordinance requires safe lift operation by the operator, which according to the current state of technology also includes protective measures against cyber threats. If the operator fails to document the measures taken, we as experts cannot determine whether it’s met its obligations.

That’s a defect we identify and have to record. This involves documentation obligations and the legal protection of the operator. It is our duty as AIBs to check the observance of all rules in force. The statistics correctly map the testing reality and for this purpose make use of the classifications mentioned in the event of defects.


Jörg Becker, the new Chairman of the Coordination Group of the Accredited In­spection Bodies in Germany. Photo: © TÜV Süd

Are you aware of specific cyber-attacks on lifts that justify such strict treatment?
Becker: I’m not aware of any proven attacks on lifts that would have resulted in an accident with passengers. That’s the good news. But one needs to see clearly that due to the increase in networking, especially also of emergency call systems, completely new attack vectors now exist. The emergency call system in particular is the component that communicates externally in almost all lifts.

Any compromising could in the worst case make sending emergency calls impossible or to lead to them being manipulated. To be quite clear: the statutory requirements we test for are primarily aimed at prevention. It makes far more sense to establish a fundamental cyber security level before major harm occurs than having to react retrospectively to incidents. That is the guiding principle of the legislature in many legal areas, not just in operational safety. 


“I’m not aware of any proven attacks on lifts that would have resulted in an accident with passengers.” Jörg Becker

Let’s come to another controversial point, the EC AIB decision on the interpretation of TRBS 1115-1. This has triggered great irritation in the sector, Schindler even had a comprehensive legal opinion drawn up against this decision. What is the position of the EC AIB here?
Becker: Our position was and is that as AIBs we are responsible for testing and also observe this obligation in full. As independent third parties, we have to be satisfied that lifts are safe. Our mandate under the Operational Safety Ordinance is clear. Naturally, we acknowledge the principle of conformity evaluation. However, currently we are in a transitional period in which European product safety law does not yet include any evaluation of the cyber security required.

TRBS 1115-1 only describes cyber security for security-relevant measurement, control and instrumentation systems. The conclusion that other parts of a lift, such as the emergency call system, do not have to be protected, is simply short-sighted. It doesn’t change anything if lift manufacturers are of a different opinion on this point. Following the publication of Annex 2 to TRBS 1115-1, this discussion should now be over. The position of the EC AIB decision was confirmed.

What legal relevance do such EC AIB decisions actually have? Do they have a presumption of conformity like a technical regulation for operational safety (TRBS)?
Becker: No, that’s an important point. The EC AIB has never claimed that its decisions have a direct legal relevance for operators in the sense of a presumption of conformity. An EC AIB decision is a coordinated consensus and codification of the joint understanding of the AIBs on the interpretation of regulations for the conduct of tests.

It ensures a uniform and transparent testing practice throughout Germany. We don’t take these decisions in a vacuum either: representatives of the responsible authorities are present at our meetings and reflect this interpretation of the regulations. What this means for an operator or a manufacturer is that an EC AIB decision ensures transparency regarding the expectations and procedure of inspection bodies but does not establish any new legal obligations. 


Dr Joachim Bühler, the managing director of the TÜV Association, recently stated that the planned division of the previous Operational Safety Ordinance into an ordinance on systems requiring supervision and an ordinance on work equipment use could contribute to simplification of requirements and replacement of 16 federal state codes. Where do you see opportunities and challenges for the AIBs here?
Becker: We would very much welcome this division. The current Operational Safety Ordinance is an extremely complex code, because it regulates all work equipment, from a simple hammer to highly complex systems that require supervision. Division into an ordinance on systems requiring supervision and one regarding work equipment use would make for far greater clarity and comprehensibility, especially for the operators of lifts and other systems requiring supervision.

The greatest challenge would be not to lower the high German safety level in this new configuration. There should not be any “simplification” at the expense of safety. But the opportunity for a clearer, more understandable and specific code is in general very great and would be supported by all of us.


When do you expect implementation?
Becker: There I’d have to gaze into my crystal ball. We do get regular information from the Federal Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs but we don’t know of any definite timetable. The hope is that it’ll all come to pass this year but there’s no guarantee. The internal processes in a ministry depend on a multitude of factors. But as EC AIB we are urging rapid implementation since we see how necessary it is in practical implementation.


The lift register (“ANKA”) has still not yet been implemented in every federal state. Bavaria, Berlin, Hessen and Rhineland Palatinate are still missing. How do you see this?
Becker: This is a crucial and much discussed aspect of the future of lift safety. For some, ANKA is needless bureaucracy, for others an important tool that will bring about an enormous increase in market surveillance, boost efficiency and ensure far greater transparency.

But the decisive point is not whether ANKA is formally instituted but rather whether it is also used in a regulatory manner. The responsible state ministries will be in charge of this. As EC AIB, we can see the advantages of ANKA and are working for efficient and uniform digital solutions. ANKA has great potential here.

ULRIKE LOTZE CONDUCTED THE INTERVIEW.

About the Person: Jörg Becker has been the new Chairman of the Coordination Group of the Accredited Inspection Bodies in Germany since the beginning of 2025. He succeeded Dieter Roas, who had been in charge of the EC AIB for over ten years.

Jörg Becker has been working for TÜV Süd for over 20 years. The mechanical engineer started his career at TÜV Süd Industrie Service as an expert for nuclear installations. In 2014, he became head of the Property Protection and IT Security Department and in 2020 took charge of the Competence Centre for Cyber Security.

Last year, the 46-year old took overall charge of the Accredited Inspection Body of TÜV Süd and was elected Chairman of the EC AIB.

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